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Abstract 
Ranked choice voting (RCV), also known as instant runoff voting (IRV), is claimed to be a more 
inclusive electoral system compared to the two-round single-vote plurality system commonly 
used in the United States. RCV is argued to be more inclusive because it maximizes the number 
of people participating in the decisive election, and because it inspires more inclusive 
campaigning as candidates try to earn second choice and third choice votes. RCV is not widely 
used in the United States; there is not a great deal of research on whether RCV achieves these 
goals. Through interviews with campaign strategists and expert election observers, this research 
determined that there was some evidence that RCV was effective in promoting greater 
inclusivity in the 2013 Minneapolis city elections, and puts forth a justice-oriented framework in 
which inclusion can be assessed. 
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Introduction 
My first experiences volunteering for a political campaign coincided with my enrollment 
in the Master of Arts in Organizational Leadership (MAOL) program at St. Catherine University. 
Campaigns are a way to advance a candidate who represents a set of ideals and priorities for 
governing, or an issue that is a priority for our collective existence. The City of Minneapolis uses 
a ranked choice voting (RCV) electoral system for municipal elections. My experience as a 
volunteer for a mayoral campaign in Minneapolis in the 2013 election cycle piqued my interest 
in how this system works for Minneapolis residents. 
The first competitive mayor's race under RCV in Minneapolis led to a lot of discussion 
about the influence of RCV on that race. The media narrative advanced a number of theories as 
to what that influence would be. Being a first-time RCV voter, as well as a campaign volunteer 
and an interested citizen, I wondered whether the theories were realized. Some of the theories 
specifically named some inclusivity benefits of RCV. As a person with intersecting marginalized 
identities, I sometimes feel like my voice is not represented, and so I personally value inclusivity 
in public affairs. A socially just democracy includes the voices of everyone governed. Thus, my 
research sought to determine whether RCV facilitates inclusion in the democratic process of 
determining our collective priorities, asking: Did the use of the ranked choice voting electoral 
system in the Minneapolis 2013 municipal elections achieve its purported benefits by functioning 
as an inclusive electoral system and by inspiring more inclusive campaigns? 
After a brief description of RCV in Minneapolis and the electoral conditions in 
Minneapolis in 2013, I will discuss the literature on RCV and on inclusion in democracy, then 
turn to the research findings, and finally analyze the findings in the context of the literature. 
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Since few places in the United States use RCV, this analysis of RCV as experienced in the 2013 
Minneapolis city election will extend the literature on RCV in practice in the United States. 
Ranked Choice Voting in Minneapolis 
RCV is an electoral system in which voters select multiple candidates for a given office, 
and rank those candidates in order of preference on a single ballot. If a voter’s first choice 
candidate is not popular enough to win, the vote then counts towards the second choice; if the 
second choice candidate is not popular enough to win, the vote then counts towards the third 
choice, etc. Under RCV, there are no primary or runoff elections. RCV is argued to be more 
inclusive than these two-round systems because it maximizes the number of people participating 
in the decisive election. RCV is also argued to be more inclusive than a single-vote plurality 
system because it inspires more inclusive campaigning as candidates try to earn second choice 
and third choice votes. The specific rules and implementation of RCV differ from place to place. 
St. Paul, MN also uses RCV, though its rules are different from those in Minneapolis. For 
example, in St. Paul, voters can rank up to six choices (Ramsey County Elections, 2013) whereas 
in Minneapolis, voters can only rank up to three choices (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter 
Services, 2013b). More data on the use of RCV will provide insight into the effectiveness of the 
RCV system. 
The City of Minneapolis adopted RCV by public referendum in 2006, and used it for 
municipal elections for the first time in 2009. In preparation for 2009 elections, the City of 
Minneapolis elections staff formally adopted the “ranked choice voting” terminology over 
“instant runoff voting” (IRV) to more accurately reflect the ballot casting process and to refrain 
from implying that results would be available “instantly” (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter 
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Services, 2013c). Regular municipal elections take place in Minneapolis every four years; 2013 
was only the second time RCV was used in Minneapolis. 
FairVote Minnesota is a statewide organization affiliated with the national FairVote 
organization. Both organizations are experts in, and advocates for, electoral reform that removes 
structural barriers to participation in democracy. FairVote, the national organization, champions 
a variety of initiatives, including the use of a national popular vote to elect the President of the 
United States (FairVote, n.d.c). FairVote Minnesota, the statewide organization, is largely 
focused on implementing RCV across Minnesota (FairVote Minnesota, n.d.a). FairVote 
Minnesota advocated for the adoption of RCV in Minneapolis leading up to the 2006 public 
referendum in which Minneapolis residents adopted the system. FairVote Minnesota’s RCV 
education efforts were prominent in Minneapolis in 2013. FairVote, the national organization, 
and FairVote Minnesota, the statewide organization, served as sources for this research. FairVote 
has advocated for the success of ranked choice voting. 
Electoral Conditions in Minneapolis in 2013 
In 2013, 35 candidates filed to run for mayor in Minneapolis and appeared on the ballot. 
The outgoing mayor, R.T. Rybak, was completing his third term and opted not to run again, 
leaving no incumbent in the race. Media coverage focused on eight mayoral candidates running 
structured campaigns with hired staff and active fundraising (Roper, 2013, October 13). Of those 
eight candidates, six filed as members of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party: Mark 
Andrew, Jackie Cherryhomes, Bob Fine, Betsy Hodges, Don Samuels, and Stephanie Woodruff. 
The DFL party did not endorse a mayoral candidate. Two of the eight mayoral candidates with 
structured campaigns filed as independents: Dan Cohen and Cam Winton. Cam Winton, despite 
filing as an independent, was backed by the Republican Party (Gilbert, 2013). 
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In Minneapolis, there are 13 city council seats. Seven of those races were considered 
competitive in 2013 (Roper, 2013, October 13). Ultimately, more than half of the city council 
members elected in 2013 were new to the council. Also on the ballot were Park & Recreation 
Board commissioners, Board of Estimate and Taxation seats, and a pair of ballot questions 
pertaining to re-writing the city charter in plain language (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter 
Services, 2013c). For all races on the ballot, but not for the ballot questions, voters had the 
option to rank up to three choices. 
Research Purpose 
This analysis seeks to answer the question of whether RCV promotes inclusivity in 
elections and campaigning. I conducted interviews with three campaign strategists to determine 
whether campaigns made different strategy choices under RCV in Minneapolis, compared to 
strategists’ previous experiences under the two-round single-vote system. These interviews also 
address why campaign strategists made these choices. I also conducted interviews with two 
expert election observers to add broader context to RCV as it is used in other U.S. American 
cities and broader perspective on previous Minneapolis elections as compared to this one. 
Because Minneapolis is one of the largest cities in the country to employ RCV, the 
research will have implications for the effectiveness of RCV in heterogeneous populations, in 
larger cities, and at different levels of government. My analysis of the social justice implications 
of RCV will inform further discussion and analysis in Minneapolis and in other jurisdictions. 
The data gathered through this study may inform further modifications to Minneapolis’ specific 
RCV implementation, and analysis of campaign strategy could inform future campaigns. This 
research will send a signal – positive or negative – to other municipalities, to state or federal 
governments, and to voters, about the strategic and social justice implications of RCV. 
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Analysis of Conceptual Context 
RCV is currently used in the United States for local elections in San Francisco, CA, 
Oakland, CA, Minneapolis, MN, St. Paul, MN, and Portland, ME, as well as in a number of 
smaller cities and by some states for overseas voters (FairVote, n.d.b). RCV has been in use for 
decades in national and local elections in Australia and Ireland (Richie, Kleppner, & Bouricius, 
2000). The American Political Science Association and American Psychological Association 
have used it for elections (Richie et al., 2000). The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences uses it to determine the winner of the Best Picture award (Silver, 2011). It has more 
widespread use than we realize. 
FairVote Minnesota (n.d.b) describes the RCV system thusly: 
Ranked Choice Voting allows voters to rank candidates on the ballot according to their 
preference - 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc. Voters cast their vote for their 
favorite candidate knowing that if he or she doesn't gather enough votes to win, their vote 
will count toward their second choice. In a single-winner election, votes cast for the least 
popular candidate are not “wasted”, but rather redistributed to more popular candidates, 
based on the voters’ second choices, until one candidate wins with a majority of votes. 
(para. 1) 
RCV is also known as instant runoff voting (IRV) because it condenses two-round 
elections into a single event. In a two-round system, a primary election precedes a general 
election, or a runoff election follows a general election (Neely & Cook, 2008). Selecting more 
than one candidate in order of preference on one ballot, as with RCV, combines the two steps 
while preserving the process of counting votes. The RCV electoral system is most commonly 
referred to as IRV in the literature. Minneapolis switched from using IRV terminology to using 
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RCV (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter Services, 2013c). While RCV and IRV electoral 
systems are effectively identical, it appears the choice of terminology is still evolving. Alameda 
County, in California, primarily uses the RCV terminology, but still makes mention of IRV. That 
locality held runoff elections before adopting RCV (Alameda County Registrar of Voters, 2012). 
RCV is claimed to be advantageous over the single-vote plurality and two-round systems 
widely used in the United States for several reasons. In a plurality system, whoever gets the most 
votes wins, even if it’s not a majority of votes (Richie et al., 2000). Some of the advantages of 
RCV are financial and related to the administration of elections and campaigns. It costs the city 
(and hence taxpayers) more to administer two rounds of elections. Election administration costs 
include printing, staffing, and ballot counting (Richie et al., 2000). Candidates must raise 
additional money for a second-round election, and short timelines for doing so affords influence 
to candidates with money or to donors willing to spend (Richie et al., 2000). Election 
administration and campaign finance, however, were outside the scope of this study. This study 
focuses on whether RCV promotes inclusivity. 
RCV is claimed to be a more inclusive electoral process because it maximizes the 
number of voters participating in the decisive election, versus a two-round election where voter 
turnout in a primary election or runoff election is typically lower than in the general election 
(Jerdonek, 2006, p. 51). RCV is also said to inspire more inclusive campaigning because 
candidates need to appeal to more broadly to voters for second and third choice votes and cannot 
afford to alienate voters with negative campaigning (Richie et al., 2000). 
In 2013, Minneapolis voters, potentially, had 35 mayoral candidates to study in order to 
select their top three choices. The rigor required to make an informed decision in casting a vote 
for mayor was a common narrative in media coverage (Roper, 2013, October 13). This is, in fact, 
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a criticism of RCV: the process of ranking choices and the increased complexity of the ballot are 
challenges to voters and may create barriers to participation (Neely & Cook, 2008). 
The remainder of this section further describes the potential barriers to voter participation 
created by having to make ranked choices, and the theoretical inclusivity effects of the RCV 
electoral system. It will also examine reasons why inclusion is necessary for a just democracy. 
Complexity Creates a Barrier to Participation 
In order to cast a ballot, a voter must first decide for whom to vote. Voters must seek out 
information about multiple candidates as they normally would, via media, the Internet, fellow 
voters, issue advocacy groups, or direct contact with campaigns. But whereas in a traditional 
single-vote, two-round system, an ideological disagreement might eliminate a candidate from a 
voter’s consideration, under RCV it might instead earn that candidate a lower ranking instead of 
no vote at all. Voters must make comparisons between multiple candidates on multiple issues, 
and then order candidates based on their positions and on the relative importance of those issues 
to the voter. A voter may instead decide that they only support one candidate and opt out of 
ranking additional choices. 
Once a voter has decided, the ballot must be cast. In a plurality system, each candidate is 
listed on the ballot once, under a single heading for a particular office. On a ranked choice ballot, 
each candidate is listed once for each choice voters are allowed to make. In Minneapolis, voters 
can rank up to three choices, so for each office the list of candidates is printed three times, in a 
first choice column, a second choice column, and a third choice column (City of Minneapolis 
Elections & Voter Services, 2013b). See a sample ballot for the 2013 Minneapolis mayor’s race 
in Appendix A. 
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The potential negative effect of this rigorous decision-making process on voting is known 
as information cost. Information cost can cause a voter not to turnout in the first place, or it can 
cause a voter in the booth to skip casting a ballot in a race due to lack of sufficient knowledge to 
make an informed decision (Neely & Cook, 2008). 
The presentation of the ballot and the act of selecting multiple candidates for one office 
on that ballot complicates voting under RCV. Selecting more than one candidate and ranking 
them in order of preference requires more information gathering and more complex decision-
making for voters. Multiple demographic groups —such as the elderly, the less educated, lower-
income voters, and voters with language barriers — historically cast ballots that go uncounted 
due to these complications (Neely & Cook, 2008). Neely & Cook (2008) analyze undervote 
trends as indicators of information cost and overvote trends as indicators of ballot confusion. The 
observed trends with respect to undervotes and overvotes differ by demographic comparison. For 
example, compromised vision and hearing (more likely in elderly voters), or limited English-
language skills are more likely to result in overvotes due to ballot confusion. Lower-income and 
less educated voters are expected to be more likely to undervote due to information cost (Neely 
& Cook, 2008). However, Neely & Cook (2008) found that electoral conditions such as having 
sufficient candidates to choose from, and adequate voter education and outreach might mitigate 
these complications. 
A More Inclusive Electoral Process 
Despite the potential barriers caused by ballot complexity, RCV is claimed to create a 
more inclusive electoral process in a structural manner by consolidating two rounds of voting 
into one. Voter turnout at primary elections and runoff elections is typically far lower than 
general elections (Jerdonek, 2006). Turnout in primary elections is skewed towards highly 
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partisan voters and magnifies race and class-based disparities in voter participation (Jerdonek, 
2006). Thus, election results are skewed. In Minneapolis in 2005, the last municipal election 
before RCV was adopted, primary election voter turnout was 15%, while general election voter 
turnout was 30% (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter Services, n.d.). Massey (as cited in 
Jerdonek, 2006), of the Minneapolis Better Ballot Campaign, the precursor to FairVote 
Minnesota, noted primary voter turnout of 8% versus general election turnout of 24% in 
Minneapolis in 2005 in wards represented largely by communities of color. Those figures are 
corroborated by data reported by the City of Minneapolis for Wards 4 and 5 (City of Minneapolis 
Elections & Voter Services, n.d.). Overall, in Minneapolis in 2005, voter turnout at the general 
election was twice that of the primary election. In one part of the city with a larger proportion of 
communities of color, voter turnout at the general election was three times that of the primary 
election. Under RCV, decisive voting happens in one election, where the most people are 
participating (Jerdonek, 2006). 
RCV also indirectly affects the inclusivity of the electoral process. By mitigating the 
“spoiler” effect and supporting the viability of all candidates, RCV allows voters a framework in 
which to vote for candidates they proactively support. In a plurality system, “spoilers” can 
significantly impact a race with more than two candidates. A spoiler is a candidate who is 
unlikely to win an election, but is able to gain enough votes to impact the race between the two 
leading candidates (Richie et al., 2000). Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential election, Ralph 
Nader in the 2000 presidential election, and Tom Horner in the 2010 Minnesota gubernatorial 
election are examples of candidates who created possible spoiler effects. Perot, Nader, and 
Horner each represented a political party outside the Democratic and Republican parties. Each of 
their candidacies impacted the leading Democratic or Republican candidates in their respective 
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races. RCV encourages participation by candidates such as these who may be considered less 
likely to win in a plurality system. Voters can support such a candidate without worrying that 
they are wasting a vote on someone who will not win, or that their first choice will undercut the 
ability of a more-desired frontrunner to be elected over a less-desired one (Hill & Richie, 2005). 
These “less viable” candidates may come from political parties outside the two dominant 
parties, and they may represent viewpoints – and hence, people – who are historically under-
represented or marginalized, such as the Socialist Alternative Party candidate for Minneapolis 
City Council (Moore, 2013). The presence of more desirable candidate options creates 
enthusiasm for voters, thus potentially leading to increased turnout (FairVote, n.d.a). 
Neely and Cook, in their examination of demographic differences in the casting of ranked 
ballots over several years of IRV elections in San Francisco, discussed the potential effects of 
electoral conditions on voter behavior, where voter behavior is quantified by rates of undervotes 
and overvotes (2008). Neely and Cook define undervotes as ballots left blank (2008). In this 
discussion, Neely and Cook supposed that the number of candidates on the ballot would matter, 
as a dearth of acceptable candidates may result in undervotes. That is, if voters do not like any of 
the candidates available to them, they are more likely to skip voting all together, or to decline to 
rank all their choices. This is consistent with Richie, Kleppner, and Bouricius’ assertion that by 
consolidating two rounds of voting into one, voters will have more choices available to them in 
the decisive election and will be more likely to like the choices they have (2000). 
More Inclusive Campaigning 
RCV is claimed to promote more inclusive campaigning because, in addition to first 
choice votes, candidates are trying to earn second and third choice votes from voters who are 
supporting other candidates. It incentivizes campaigns to run more issue-oriented campaigns and 
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to be inclusive in addressing the needs and concerns of different constituencies (Richie et al., 
2000). In this manner, campaigns are working to attract support for their candidate, and are 
incentivized to maintain a more positive tone by refraining from negative and personal attacks, in 
order to earn second and third choice votes. This is in contrast to the use of negative 
campaigning in the traditional plurality system, in which campaigns may work to simply turn a 
voter away from an opponent, instead of earning a voter’s support for one’s own candidate 
(Richie et al., 2000). Personal attacks are one way campaigns distinguish candidates from each 
other. With RCV, when candidates cannot be distinguished based on policy positions, candidates 
may be less likely to use negative attacks to make distinctions because of the need to earn second 
and third choice votes (Richie et al., 2000). 
Inclusion in Democracy and Elections 
In order to assess whether the inclusivity benefits of RCV were met, an understanding of 
inclusivity in the context of elections and democracy must be established. This study assumes 
that justice in democracy is held as an ideal. Weil (as cited in Staples, 2012) described social 
justice: 
[S]ocial justice implies commitment to fairness in our dealings with each other in the 
major aspects of our lives—the political, economic, social and civic realms. In society, 
social justice should foster equal human rights, distributive justice, and a structure of 
opportunity and be grounded in representative and participatory democracy. (p. 287) 
Young (2000) sets out the following principles of justice in democracy: 
Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest 
numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are 
supported by the best reasons. This model of democratic processes entails several 
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normative ideals for the relationships and dispositions of deliberating parties, among 
them inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity. (p. 23) 
Though Young, in this passage, is describing participatory democracy, the framework can 
still be applied to electoral democracy. Young’s description emphasizes not the ultimate choice, 
but the process of arriving at that decision. Of the normative ideals Young calls out, inclusion 
and political equality have specific relevance to this study. Young (2000) explains them thusly: 
Inclusion. On this model, a democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those 
affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision-making… Political 
equality. As a normative ideal, democracy means political equality. Not only should all 
those affected be nominally included in decision-making, but they should be included on 
equal terms. All ought to have an equal right and effective opportunity to express their 
interests and concerns. (p.23) 
In the above definitions, Young points to both discussion and decision-making as related 
but separate elements of the democratic process. In using Young’s participatory democracy 
framework to analyze electoral democracy, I cast election day as a significant point of decision-
making. I consider the public deliberation leading up to the election day decision as the period of 
time in which campaigns are ongoing, how campaigns act, and how voters interact with and 
around them. The two parts of the research question also map to these elements. The question of 
whether RCV functions as an inclusive electoral system speaks to what happens on election day, 
when votes cast are translated into a collective decision on who should hold elected office. The 
question of whether RCV inspires more inclusive campaigns speaks to the public deliberation 
process that happens over the course of a campaign. 
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Under this social justice point of view, inclusion and equality are two guiding principles 
for both the public deliberation and the public decision-making elements of the democratic 
process. This ideal of justice in democracy explains why the notion of inclusivity is important, 
and why the potential inclusivity effects of RCV are considered to be beneficial. 
Community Organizing and Civic Participation 
Staples (2012) defines community organizing as “collective action by community 
members drawing on the strength of numbers, participatory processes, and indigenous leadership 
to decrease power disparities and achieve shared goals for social change” (p. 288). This 
definition articulates some specific components of community organizing, illustrating that it is 
not just a process for encouraging people to vote, and to vote a certain way. Community 
organizing is a specific way of going about civic participation. 
According to Shaw (2005): 
Community organizing is a key to electoral success because it helps people make the 
connections between the problems they face… and decisions by specific politicians…. 
Participants in community organizing become more optimistic about their ability to make 
government work for them, and are far more likely to vote for a candidate who pledges to 
address their concerns. In contrast, the unorganized remain disconnected from collective 
action, have no personal experience in seeing government work for them, have less 
confidence in their ability to shape the forces impacting them, and are more likely to 
respond to appeals based on fear. (p. 35-36) 
Shaw explains that community organizing influences electoral politics by connecting 
voters first to an issue that impacts them, and then by connecting candidate positions and past 
performance to the issue (2005, p. 38-39). Community organizing leaders may also situate 
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themselves in positions of influence within the electoral system, for example by acting as a 
precinct leader during a Get out the Vote (GOTV) campaign. Indigenous leadership – leadership 
from within an organizing community – and leadership development is an integral part of 
community organizing; linking leadership in issue organizing with leadership in the electoral 
process helps to maintain integrity in a community organization and connections between issues 
and elected representatives (Shaw, 2005, p. 39). 
Shaw’s description demonstrates the relationship between community organizing and 
political campaigning. Community organizing is an activity of citizens. It is a mechanism of 
public deliberation that co-exists with political campaigns and potentially integrates with them at 
the time of elections. Community organizing is inherently a civic engagement strategy in that it 
facilitates discussion and then action from citizens. Community organizing efforts can be 
leveraged to address specific issues, in order to achieve the adoption or defeat of a policy. In an 
electoral context, community organizing efforts can be leveraged in several ways. Community 
organizing can be leveraged by a campaign, for the purpose of getting a candidate elected, by 
engaging citizens on multiple issues in the candidate’s platform. Community organizing can be 
leveraged by an issue-interest group, independently of or in coordination with a campaign, for 
the purpose of getting a candidate elected, based on one or more of the candidate’s policy 
positions. Also, community organizing can be leveraged by an issue-interest group, 
independently of a campaign, to achieve a specific policy outcome, by engaging citizens on that 
issue and by advocating for candidates who support that policy. 
Christens examines community organizing as a relational activity, citing evidence that 
community organizing processes result in an increased sense of community among participants 
(2010, p. 887). The Minnesota Compass project examines sense of community as experienced in 
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Minnesota. Minnesota Compass is an ongoing research project tracking social indicators that 
measure progress in the state of Minnesota (Wilder Research, n.d.). Minnesota Compass defines 
sense of community as “a sense that [social] networks exist and can work for the benefit of the 
community” (Wilder Research, 2013a, para. 1), and considers strong communities to have strong 
social networks where residents “share information, support one another, and work on common 
issues” (Wilder Research, 2013a, para. 1). Minnesota Compass uses four factors to define and 
measure civic engagement: sense of community, perceived ability to improve community, 
volunteerism, and voter turnout (Wilder Research, 2013a). These four factors influence each 
other in reciprocal fashion. For example, a perceived ability to improve community might inspire 
one to vote or to volunteer. Voting might increase one’s sense of community. Further, Minnesota 
Compass states as its civic engagement goal, “Our state will foster a climate of inclusion that 
encourages active participation from everyone living in our community” (Wilder Research, n.d., 
para. 1).  
Given the Minnesota Compass definition of sense of community as a part of civic 
engagement, and a stated goal of the Minnesota Compass project to encourage active 
participation from everyone in a community, I suppose that strategies that enhance sense of 
community lead to increased civic engagement. If community organizing is a driver of increased 
sense of community (Christens, 2010, p. 887), then community organizing could contribute to 
increased civic engagement. Supposing that the four factors of civic engagement do affect each 
other reciprocally, we can also see how the community organizing process has multiple effects 
on civic engagement. The improved sense of community fostered by community organizing also 
has the potential to increase voter turnout, increase volunteerism, and increase one’s perceived 
ability to improve community. For example, my personal perceived ability to improve my 
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community led to my continued volunteerism for a mayoral campaign that employed a 
community organizing strategy in Minneapolis in 2013. 
Christens described a model of community organizing in which conversations are used as 
a method for building public relationships between people (2010). Christens defined public 
relationships as one-to-one relationships built specifically through the organizing process (2010). 
According to this model, these one-to-one conversations are lead by organizers or volunteers. 
The conversations are semi-structured in that they aim to obtain and share specific information. 
This model of community organizing supposes that isolated attempts at change stemming from 
isolated experiences of hardship are disempowered. The purpose of this model is to build 
relationships through conversation so as to remove that isolation and hence create social power 
to effect change (Christens, 2010). Christens identified three relational components in these 
conversations: broadening networks of relationships, developing new understandings of the 
social world, and strengthening commitment to civic involvement (2010). 
One example of how these one-to-one conversations are carried out in an electoral 
campaign context is the voter persuasion conversation. A campaign executes this strategy by 
tailoring the voter persuasion script used in its phone banking and door knocking activities. A 
script might employ the relational component of developing new understandings of the social 
world by inviting a voter to speak freely about an issue of concern. 
Having discussed the use of conversations in community organizing for the purpose of 
building relationships between people as a means to develop social power, let us now look at 
another way conversation-based community organizing influences civic participation. Young 
speaks to cultural forces by which people are excluded from discussion and decision-making in 
politics. Young’s definition of cultural exclusion addresses ways that “people lack effective 
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opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and 
procedures of decision-making” (2000, p. 55). Community organizing serves to mitigate these 
cultural exclusion forces by developing individuals’ ability and opportunity to influence others’ 
thinking through the practice of carrying out one-to-one conversations. As a campaign organizer 
or volunteer with the ability to contact voters, one has access to the formal decision-making 
process. By developing skill at voter persuasion through conversation, an organizer or volunteer 
can better influence others’ thinking from within this formal structure. 
Young also identifies social difference as a political resource, in which individuals’ 
sharing of personal experience helps to create a broader understanding of a social situation. 
Aiming to promote social justice through public action requires more than framing debate 
in terms that appeal to justice. It requires an objective understanding of the society, a 
comprehensive account of its relations and structured processes, its material locations and 
environmental conditions, a detailed knowledge of events and conditions in different 
places and positions, and the ability to predict the likely consequences of actions and 
policies. Only pooling the situated knowledge of all social positions can produce such 
social knowledge. (2000, p. 117) 
Christens’ concept of developing new understandings of the social world is well aligned 
with Young’s principle of social knowledge as a necessary component of promoting social 
justice through public action. One-to-one conversations in which participants seek to develop 
new understandings of the social world by sharing information allow participants to co-construct 
social knowledge based on what each participant shares about their own social position. The 
public relationships built from this model of community organizing through conversations 
empower collective action. 
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Young also explores the relationship of democratic representation and social perspective: 
[R]epresentation and participation are not alternatives in an inclusive communicative 
democracy, but require each. Institutions of representation help organize political 
discussion and decision-making, introducing procedures and a reasonable division of 
labour. Thereby citizens have objectives around which they can organize with one 
another and participate in anticipatory and retrospective discussion, criticism, and 
evaluation. (2000, p. 132) 
Young continues to explain representation: 
What do I mean when I say that I feel represented in the political process? There are 
many possible answers to this question, but three stand out for me as important. First, I 
feel represented when someone is looking after the interests I take as mine and share with 
some others. Secondly, it is important to me that the principles, values, and priorities that 
I think should guide political decisions are voiced in discussion. Finally, I feel 
represented when at least some of those discussing and voting on policies understand and 
express the kind of social experience I have because of my social group position and the 
history of social group relations. (2000, p. 134) 
Campaign strategies based on community organizing principles, such as one-to-one 
conversations with voters, may help voters decide which candidates best represent them. 
Community organizing as described by Shaw and Christens convenes citizens for public 
deliberation through one-to-one conversations. It co-exists and potentially integrates with 
political campaigns at the time of elections, and can serve as one mechanism for the 
representation and participation Young describes by helping to organize political conversation. 
In doing so, it also potentially shifts the power to define the terms of the discussion away from 
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established systems and to the organizing community. Community organizing practices can be 
carried out by political campaigns, independently of them, or in coordination with them. 
Community organizing also can play a role in defining a community’s shared interests, in 
defining principles, values, and priorities, and in communicating social experiences. In all these 
ways, community organizing can be a powerful tool for public deliberation and a means to create 
and maintain inclusion in the democratic process. 
Methodology and Validity 
My research sought to answer the question: Did the use of the ranked choice voting 
electoral system in the Minneapolis 2013 municipal elections achieve its purported benefits by 
functioning as an inclusive electoral system and by inspiring more inclusive campaigns? I used 
two research methods to collect data: a literature review, and interviews with subject matter 
experts. I also consulted publicly available election data for voter turnout and ranked choices. 
Methodology 
I began with a review of the literature to more deeply understand and articulate the 
concept of RCV. This review explained how RCV works from the perspective of both voters and 
of election administrators, and explained the arguments in favor of using RCV over the two-
round single-vote electoral system commonly used in the United States. It also revealed concerns 
about potential barriers to voter participation created by RCV, uncovered existing studies that 
demonstrate the effectiveness and disadvantages of RCV, and helped to define concepts of social 
justice and inclusion in democracy. 
Next, I conducted scripted interviews to obtain qualitative data on campaign strategy. I 
identified campaigns of individuals who ran for elected office in Minneapolis in 2013. These 
primarily included individuals running for mayor or for city council, but also included 
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individuals running for Park and Recreation Board or Board of Estimate and Taxation. In 
selecting campaigns to approach for interviews, I assessed via reputational approach (i.e., from 
personal experience or a preliminary inquiry) if a campaign employed any strategy specific to 
RCV. Whether the candidate won or lost their election did not impact their campaign’s eligibility 
for inclusion in the study. Among those selected, I interviewed campaign managers and other 
staff responsible for determining strategy. Such individuals are subject matter experts when it 
comes to campaign strategy. They were likely to be more knowledgeable and more accessible 
than the candidate. 
Interviews with campaign strategists helped to determine what specific strategy choices 
were made that were unique to the RCV process, why those choices were made, and how those 
choices differed from choices made under the previous electoral system. Those sources spoke to 
the benefits and disadvantages of RCV as an inspiration to more inclusive campaigning. I 
obtained access to campaign staff through candidate websites, and through personal contacts 
gained through my volunteer experience and engagement with campaigns during this election 
cycle. I conducted three interviews with campaign strategists. Campaign strategist interviews 
were conducted under the condition of confidentiality; strategists will be identified throughout 
this study as Strategist A, Strategist B, and Strategist C. 
I also conducted semi-scripted interviews with two expert observers of elections and of 
RCV. David Schultz is a professor of political science at Hamline University, and also a 
professor of law at both the Hamline University and University of Minnesota Law Schools. 
Schultz has observed and taught on elections in Minnesota, across the United States, and in 
Europe. He has observed RCV specifically in multiple jurisdictions, including Minneapolis, MN; 
St. Paul, MN; Cambridge, MA; Oakland, CA; and Australia. 
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Josh Nussbaum served as the Education Campaign Manager for FairVote Minnesota in 
2013. Nussbaum has served as a campaign manager and in other campaign strategy roles for 
issue, candidate, and legislative campaigns. Nussbaum’s experience in Minnesota and elsewhere 
in the United States includes municipal, county, and statewide races. He has also overseen issue 
campaigns in India, at the local level and in a national election context. 
Schultz and Nussbaum provided context for the use of RCV in other locations outside of 
Minnesota. They also provided context on the impact of RCV on this election in Minneapolis as 
compared to previous elections. These interviews explored RCV as an inspiration to more 
inclusive campaigning, and also provided additional data addressing the benefits and 
disadvantages of RCV as a more inclusive electoral system. I identified potential expert election 
observer sources through review of the literature, personal contacts, and local media exposure. 
Interviewees were all asked for consent to be identified by name, and for consent to be 
audio-recorded. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed, then categorized and coded 
to identify any emergent themes. I compared and contrasted campaign strategy choices and 
results as described by the interviewees, and then compared that data to the espoused inclusivity 
advantages of RCV. The research instruments used in both sets of interviews can be found in 
Appendix B.  
I supplemented the qualitative data with quantitative data. Election results, including 
voter turnout and ranked choice data for each precinct, are publicly available. I looked at voter 
turnout in Minneapolis municipal elections from 2001-2013 and Minneapolis federal elections 
from 2006-2012 to identify trends. I also looked at expert analysis of this turnout and ranked 
choice data as part of my literature review. A sample ballot from the Minneapolis 2013 
municipal election can be found in Appendix A. 
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I then analyzed my findings on RCV’s effectiveness in promoting inclusivity to assess 
RCV’s ethical implications for campaign strategy and voter participation. The principles of 
justice and inclusion in democracy, presented in the conceptual context, are the framework for 
this analysis. 
Validity 
Two common sources of bias were likely in conducting this research. Researcher bias 
was a strong possibility. To a lesser extent, reactivity was also a possibility. I came to study this 
topic precisely because I personally volunteered for a mayoral campaign in the election in 
question. I followed the mayor’s race and some city council races closely, having frequent 
interactions with candidates, other volunteers, interested citizens, and campaign staff. I was 
frequently exposed to discussion and media coverage of both the election and the RCV system. 
My personal involvement with this campaign was disclosed to all subjects. Additionally, the use 
of FairVote and FairVote Minnesota as resources are a potential source of bias. National and 
local FairVote organizations are experts on the topic of RCV; much of the RCV literature comes 
from them. FairVote Minnesota advocated for the adoption of RCV and led public education 
efforts on RCV for this election. A representative from FairVote Minnesota was a source for this 
research. In order to ensure a valid study, a number of techniques were employed, as described 
by Maxwell in his book Qualitative Research Design (2013). 
I gathered rich data by ensuring variability in my interview subjects. I interviewed 
strategists representing different campaigns for a given office and representing campaigns for 
different offices, and subject matter experts on local elections and RCV who were unaffiliated 
with any particular campaign. My interview questions asked for specific examples to encourage 
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storytelling and to draw out concrete evidence. Additionally, all interviews were audio-recorded 
and transcribed to eliminate the researcher bias inherent in note taking. 
Triangulation was employed to a limited extent. Campaign strategists and expert election 
observers provided different perspectives on the research question. Some claims put forth in 
interviews were corroborated by publicly available election results. All subjects were asked to 
compare and contrast their experience and observations of this election to other elections in 
which a system other than RCV was used. 
Finally, research and interview questions can easily be reframed for the purpose of 
identifying and analyzing discrepant evidence and negative cases. If discrepant evidence is found 
and alternative conclusions cannot be determined, the data will nonetheless be reported. 
Findings 
The campaign strategists and expert election observers I interviewed described a number 
of RCV-oriented strategies that campaigns used in Minneapolis municipal elections in 2013. 
Interviewees reported that campaigns broadly used the word “choice” in talking about support 
for candidates, that campaigns expanded their voter communication universes, and that 
campaigns used personality-based strategies for distinguishing candidates from competitors. 
Coalition campaigning, one possible RCV strategy observed in other municipalities, was not 
seen as a factor in Minneapolis in 2013. This section will further describe each of these observed 
RCV-oriented strategies and describe how campaigns assessed the success of RCV-oriented 
strategies. This section will also present strategists’ and observers’ characterizations of public 
education on RCV, outreach to historically under-represented populations, and positive versus 
negative campaigning. 
Campaigns Used RCV-Specific Tactics 
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All of the campaign strategists I interviewed reported employing some RCV-oriented 
strategy, though RCV-specific tactics were used to widely varying degrees. In general, mayoral 
campaigns were more sophisticated and had bigger budgets than city council campaigns, and 
were more likely to use RCV-specific strategies. Given interviewees’ experiences, the results and 
findings here are relevant to mayoral and city council races but are not representative of races for 
Park & Recreation Board or for Board of Estimate and Taxation. 
The language of choice. While not every campaign had an explicit strategy to earn 
second and third choice votes, every campaign did use the language of “choice” in soliciting 
support. Earning second and third choice votes is important because, under RCV, votes for less 
popular candidates are redistributed to more popular candidates, according to second and third 
choices, until one candidate has a majority of the remaining votes. Schultz said, “[T]he most 
important [strategy I observed] was clearly asking to be second choice.” Nussbaum similarly 
observed that, “Most of the top-tier mayoral candidates would say instead of ‘Support [Candidate 
X]’ it was ‘[Candidate X], your top choice for mayor’ or ‘your first choice for mayor.’ They’d 
incorporate ‘choice’ into it somehow.” 
Canvassing scripts instructed phone callers and door knockers to ask voters who they 
were ranking as their first, second, and third choices; and if voters would consider a candidate as 
a first, second, or third choice. According to Strategist C, “Our first ask was ‘will you support 
[our candidate] in the election?’ If they said, ‘No, I’m supporting this person,’ it was ‘Great I 
understand that, will you consider [our candidate] for your second choice vote?’” 
Broader voter communication universe. The voter communication universe is the 
group of voters that meet a campaign’s criteria for contact. In this RCV election, campaigns 
stayed in communication with some voters who were identified as supporting a different 
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candidate, and made strategic calculations about which of these voters to include. According to 
Strategist A, “In a ranked choice voting election you have to talk to everybody because even if 
they’re voting for [someone else], you want them to make you second.” Strategist C explained: 
We felt like it was between [our candidate] and [another frontrunner] and so… anybody 
who we [identified as supporting] any of the other candidates, we kept them on our list 
for direct mail, we kept them on our list for blast emails, and we actually kept them on 
our door knock list so we could check in with them again and ask about, track their 
second place votes… 
Interviewees indicated that had this been a non-RCV election, campaigns typically would 
not have talked to voters they identified as supporting other candidates. Said Nussbaum, 
“Traditionally in a non-RCV campaign you’d just go after people identified as voting for you… 
If you identify someone who’s not supporting you, you don’t talk to them anymore.” Strategist A 
reported the same. Strategist C, however, said that had this been a traditional election, the 
campaign might have talked to voters supporting other candidates anyway. 
[Our candidate], [the other frontrunner], and [a third candidate] would have all been in 
the same primary which means that as far as our communication with [the third 
candidate] was concerned, we would have treated it the exact same leading up to the 
primary. Following the primary it would be, “I know [the third candidate] was your first 
choice, here’s some of the things we have in common, here’s why, now that [the third 
candidate] is out, we hope we can earn your support.” 
This example Strategist C gave for a non-RCV election, in which a campaign stays in 
contact with another candidate’s supporters, mirrors a voter contact strategy described by other 
strategists and by expert election observers as being RCV-specific. This example seems to 
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indicate that this campaign strategist would apply an RCV-oriented strategy in a non-RCV 
election, and that its effectiveness might depend on the electoral conditions, such as having two 
clear frontrunners in a small field of candidates. 
When a campaign determined that its candidate was likely one of two frontrunners in a 
given race, the campaign chose not to stay in contact with identified supporters of the other 
frontrunner. As frontrunners, both candidates would remain in the race as other candidates 
dropped out due to lower vote totals. The two frontrunners would never have their second and 
third choice votes counted; thus, as one frontrunner, it was not important or useful to court 
second or third choice votes from supporters of the other frontrunner. However, it was important 
to court second and third choice votes from supporters of candidates who seemed less viable, 
because it was more likely those second and third choice votes would actually be counted. 
Strategist A, as a representative of a front-running campaign, said, “It became clearer and clearer 
the closer the election got that if we were on other people’s ballots, other than [the other 
frontrunner’s], they were first place votes for us eventually.” 
Campaign strategists also contrasted voter targeting in a traditional campaign versus an 
RCV campaign, saying they would have first targeted the smaller number of likely primary 
voters before pivoting to broader outreach between the primary and the general elections. 
Strategist A said, “Through public data available at the Secretary of State’s office we know the 
voters who vote in primaries. We know their names, their phone numbers, and their addresses. 
And that is a very small pool and it’s a pool that’s very hard to grow in a campaign.” Strategist A 
further explained how campaign staffing would have differed in the traditional two-round 
system: “In a primary and general election scenario we would have had a smaller field staff at 
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the beginning to focus on what would be a pretty defined primary election universe that we 
probably wouldn’t spend a whole lot of time trying to expand….” 
In describing Get out the Vote (GOTV) strategies, campaign strategists revealed that the 
structure of the GOTV operation was conventional, relative to campaigning in a traditional two-
round election. There was a dedicated GOTV Director role on the campaign staff. In the final 
week before the election, campaign staff and volunteers contacted voters through phone calling 
and door knocking to remind voters when and where to vote. There were two targeted voter 
populations in the GOTV phase of the campaign. The first population was identified supporters 
who needed to be reminded or encouraged to vote. Canvassing scripts focused on election day 
logistics and confirmation of support. The second population was likely voters who still needed 
to be persuaded to support a candidate. Canvassing scripts for this population still largely 
focused on persuasion, but also included election day logistics. 
The only differences in GOTV operations mirrored the differences in voter persuasion 
strategy described above. Campaigns stayed in communication with voters who supported the 
candidate as a second or third choice and included those voters in GOTV phone calling and door 
knocking efforts. Observed Nussbaum, “Traditionally in a non-RCV campaign you’d just go 
after people identified as voting for you. Betsy Hodges, for instance, they turned out people that 
not only were top Betsy, but they turned out people that were second and third choice Betsy.” 
Campaigns who considered their candidate to be one of the top two in a race did exclude the 
other top candidate’s supporters from their GOTV program as well. 
Distinguishing the candidate from competitors. The strategy for distinguishing the 
candidate from competitors varied based on the stage of the campaign and the number of 
competitive candidates in the race. Standing out in a field of 35 candidates for mayor (with eight 
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competitive candidates) warranted a different strategy from a city council campaign with two top 
candidates. Endorsements from issue organizations played a role. A candidate’s previous 
experience played a role. 
Candidates did distinguish themselves by their positions on the issues, but there were 
many cases where candidates did not significantly differ in their policy positions. Among 
mayoral candidates, several of the eight leading candidates supported investment in streetcars, 
several opposed streetcars, several supported investment in education, and several supported 
improvement of basic city services. Most of the eight leading mayoral candidates opposed 
expanding capacity at a county facility that burns garbage for energy recovery. For each of those 
policy positions, there was more than one leading candidate who supported it. 
The identity of the candidate played a role; in some cases, simply being a woman and/or 
a person of color was a distinguishing feature. In the mayor’s race, out of 35 candidates, six were 
women; of the eight candidates running structured campaigns, three were white women (one of 
whom identified as LGBT), one was a man of color, and the remaining four were white men. 
According to campaign strategists, city council campaigns mostly focused on candidates’ 
positions on issues and on candidates’ qualifications. For example, Strategist C’s campaign 
research indicated that voters thought that the previous holder of the office wasn’t responsive 
enough to constituents, so the campaign crafted an image of responsiveness for the candidate. 
“One of the things we heard early on was a lack of constituent services and support from the 
office before then so we wanted to make sure that that was a top priority for us, that [our 
candidate] was seen as responsive.” Strategist C had the candidate do a large proportion of the 
campaign’s voter contact. The campaign also made the candidate’s contact information widely 
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available, instructing the candidate to answer the phone as much as possible, and to return phone 
calls and emails in a timely fashion. 
  The ways in which campaigns distinguished candidates from competitors, by focusing 
on a candidate’s positions and qualifications, demonstrated the choice to largely remain positive 
in campaigning and to not overtly bash competitors. For example, one mayoral candidate 
frequently stated in candidate forums that she said the same thing to everyone, everywhere she 
went. This deliberate word choice implied that one of the other candidates did not do so, and 
effectively communicated that message without explicitly calling out the candidate in question 
and without even directly referring to that candidate. Mayoral candidates often explicitly agreed 
with each other in candidate forums; many of the highest profile candidates were from the same 
political party and had largely similar ideological positions on many issues. 
Mayoral campaigns employed a more complex and nuanced approach to distinguishing 
candidates. Mayoral campaigns had larger budgets relative to city council races (on average, for 
competitive campaigns), a higher media profile, and more public events such as candidate 
forums. At the mayoral level, it was also clear that personality and comportment of both the 
candidate and the campaign were specifically leveraged to distinguish a candidate’s brand from 
competitors. One mayoral campaign distinguished its candidate by emphasizing the youthful 
energy of the candidate (who was not young) and that candidate’s support from youth groups, as 
well as by driving a Toyota Prius hybrid electric car decorated in the campaign’s colors, dubbed 
the “Energy Express.” One mayoral campaign emphasized the candidate’s affinity for Wonder 
Woman; the candidate wore Wonder Woman themed shirts to casual events, and the campaign 
staff and volunteers wore Wonder Woman themed shirts at the endorsing convention and other 
events. One mayoral campaign held a series of attention-grabbing press conferences, including 
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one where the candidate stood in a pothole while talking about public works and another where 
the candidate ran a vacuum cleaner while talking about airport noise. 
Strategist A discussed the makeup of the campaign staff and supporters: 
The campaign itself stood out. Our folks came from their communities. Our campaign 
looked like the City of Minneapolis. That’s not to say that other folks didn’t have 
African-American or Latino or Somali support. Obviously [other candidates] had a lot of 
Somali support but I think if you went to campaign events we were the most diverse 
campaign both in staff, volunteers, and supporters, as any out there. That really made us 
stand out. 
Speaking of a pre-election day rally, Strategist A said, “I couldn’t believe the diversity in 
that room. I mean, gender, age, ethnicity. That was presidential diversity right there. I felt really 
good about the campaign when I saw that.” Strategist A also noted the personality of campaign 
staff as indicative of the personality of the campaign. “We went into these forums and you had 
the other campaign staffs in suits and ties, all buttoned up like they’re supposed to, and in walks 
[our staff] in their combat boots and red hair. It was awesome.” 
Assessing success. There was no standard indicator of success in earning second and 
third choice votes, but campaigns did have some metrics that they tracked. Prior to the election, 
one metric was the number of canvassed voters who indicated support for a candidate as one of 
three choices. Correspondingly, after the election, one metric was the number of ballots on which 
a candidate appeared in total, as one of three choices. 
Strategist A cited longer-than-average conversations with voters as a metric, noting that 
the campaign emphasized community organizing strategies for its voter contact program. 
Strategist A credited the skill of the campaign’s field staff, many of whom had experience from 
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prior campaigns using community organizing strategies that specifically emphasized long 
conversations with voters, “versus some of the other campaign staffs that had your traditional 
party hacks as organizers who were used to having one minute conversations about who were 
they voting for.” 
Winning the election was considered one metric of the success of an overall campaign. 
Strategist A’s campaign considered the total number of first, second, and third choice votes as a 
metric of success. Winning the election was not, however, considered a clear indicator of success 
in earning second and third choice votes in this election. While election results were not a factor 
in determining which campaigns to interview, participants did not represent a diversity of 
election outcomes. It’s possible that winning or losing the election could have biased a campaign 
strategist’s perception of other indicators of success. Some interviewees believed that ultimately 
election results would have been the same in all city council races in the traditional system, 
because the allocation of second and third choice votes did not cause one candidate to be elected 
over another candidate who led based on first choice votes alone. 
Strategist B articulated a different perspective on success, apart from the number of votes 
cast, instead focusing on who cast votes. Strategist B’s campaign observed that a Somali 
candidate whom they did not consider a viable contender garnered support and turnout from 
Somali voters. Strategist B asserted that the campaign, with the capacity that it had, could not 
target these Somali voters in the usual way because the voters did not have a regular voting 
history. Strategist B speculated that, in a traditional campaign, those Somali voters may have 
participated in the primary to support the Somali candidate, but when the Somali candidate did 
not make it through the primary to participate in the general election, it was, in Strategist B’s 
opinion, unlikely that those voters would have turned out for the general election. There would 
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have been no Somali candidate to connect with those voters, and other campaigns wouldn’t have 
had the ability or capacity to reach them via traditional targeting methods. Further, because those 
Somali voters did rank their choices in this RCV election, their second and third choice votes 
were counted in the decisive election (with some of those votes going for the eventual winner), 
instead of being exhausted in the primary. Said Strategist B: 
RCV also allowed the Somali community to show and vote for a Somali person, and then 
help elect [our candidate], which otherwise, without RCV, that community would not 
have been able to do that. So… successful for what? Successful for [our candidate, who 
won]. But I also think successful for the Somali community because they were able to 
really use two votes in that way. 
Coalition campaigning. Richie et al. (2000) identified coalition building as an 
advantageous strategy for an RCV campaign, as a means to appeal more broadly to voters, and in 
particular to appeal to supporters of other candidates. Roper (2013, October 28), in reporting on 
RCV elections in California as potential indicators of what could happen in Minneapolis, 
described the campaign of Jean Quan, the eventual winner of the 2010 race for mayor of 
Oakland, CA: 
Quan’s victory is often attributed to the alliance she struck with several other candidates 
who coalesced around the goal of beating Perata, a polarizing and well-financed former 
state senator who outspent his opponents. Quan and her allies held a joint news 
conference accusing Perata of trying to buy the election, and Quan instructed her 
supporters to list her City Council colleague Rebecca Kaplan as their second choice. 
(para. 10) 
Running head: RANKED CHOICE VOTING IN MINNEAPOLIS 2013 ELECTIONS  
 
39
Some explicit coalition campaigning tactics were evident but not prominent in this 
election. One city council campaign made a strategic agreement with another campaign in the 
race that each would instruct their supporters to list the other candidate as a second choice. One 
of the candidates was a frontrunner in the race; the other candidate was not. The frontrunner’s 
campaign decided to communicate the voting strategy near the very end of the race, in the last 
week leading up to election day, so while the coalition message was communicated, the 
campaigns did not otherwise behave in a sustained, coordinated way. 
At a public forum, some of the leading mayoral candidates indicated which other mayoral 
candidates they would vote for as their second and third choice, revealing a loose coalition of 
mutual supporters (Roper, 2013, October 11). A group of fringe mayoral candidates met 
regularly, dubbing themselves the “Mayoral Council,” to discuss the election (Nelson, 2013). 
Schultz observed that coalition campaigning was not prominent in this election, and that 
it has not been prominent in other ranked choice voting elections in the United States. 
We have no evidence one way or the other, based upon two elections in Minneapolis or 
in St. Paul. And really no good evidence, at least in the few elections run in the United 
States. You may have other incentive structures in Australia and around the world for 
doing coalitional if they have that, but again, the jury is out at this point. 
Outreach to Historically Under-represented Populations 
Subjects were asked about campaigns’ outreach to historically under-represented 
populations. Mayoral campaigns employed sophisticated structures for targeting voters based on 
demographics, such as gender or ethnicity. At the city council level, such targeting varied widely 
based on demographics of the ward and the candidate’s personal history. The most common way 
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to incorporate this outreach was through hiring staff and garnering support of key volunteers 
connected to various communities. 
Strategist A described having culturally-specific outreach plans for Somali, Latino, and 
Native American communities, as well as LGBT voters and women. These outreach plans 
included using staff and volunteers who spoke Somali or Spanish, prioritizing these groups’ 
events over others, using culturally-specific literature, seeking endorsements from culturally-
affiliated groups, cultivating donors from within these communities, and tailoring canvassing 
scripts to the identified priorities of different groups. 
Campaign strategists acknowledged that, while they considered it important to be in 
contact with as many potential voters as possible, they thought it would not have been possible to 
win without doing so, and choices made about doing such outreach were specifically made with 
the goal of earning votes and winning the election. They were keenly aware that, where 
demographics are diverse, appealing across interests and identities is crucial. Strategist A said: 
What ranked choice voting does do is it makes you talk to everyone, which I think is a 
great great great thing.… In a regular general election, we would have been able to cut 
the campaign field staff in half, because we would only have needed to talk to half the 
number of people that we did.… I think this was a huge mistake that the other campaigns 
made, is that they didn’t have an operation to go city-wide. 
Strategist B noted: 
A majority of the people who voted for [our candidate] were white. This is still a white 
town.… [W]hen you look not at population but on voting, the majority of voters are not 
people of color. But in terms of making that difference, both in [our] getting the 
endorsement and getting elected, those under-represented communities made a 
Running head: RANKED CHOICE VOTING IN MINNEAPOLIS 2013 ELECTIONS  
 
41
difference. Made the difference.… It’s the values, too, but this campaign did not do 
things that were not about advancing the campaign. 
Schultz spoke to this reality as well. “This is a city whose diversity is starting to rapidly 
change…. It’s hard to separate out what I call the demographic shift versus the ranked choice 
voting shift.” 
This does not hold true in all parts of the City of Minneapolis, though. Strategist C, when 
asked about outreach to historically under-represented populations, said that the campaign did 
not do any, because the demographics of the Ward do not include such populations. 
Some campaigns effectively leveraged community organizing strategies to engage under-
represented communities throughout the electoral process. Affinity groups are organizations that 
have formed to serve the needs of a group of people who share similar characteristics, such as 
ethnicity or location. Many of these organizations already existed to serve the needs of under-
represented communities and participated in these engagement processes as well. This 
organizing turned out caucus-goers, elected delegates to endorsing conventions, engaged on 
community-specific issues, leveraged existing affinity groups to carry out voter persuasion, 
raised funds, and turned out voters on election day. This process also illuminated that identity-
based affinity for candidates is a continuing phenomenon. The clearest example was Strategist 
B’s story of the Somali candidate that drove turnout among Somali voters, even though the 
Somali candidate was unlikely to win. 
RCV Education 
Interviewees observed voter education on how to cast a ranked choice ballot from several 
different sources. The City of Minneapolis conducted a voter education campaign which 
included sending a sample ballot to all residents as well as support at polling places. FairVote 
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Minnesota also did public education work. Both the city and FairVote Minnesota carried out 
education efforts by attending or convening community events. Public education efforts were 
accessible online at their respective websites as well as in the media. 
Community groups also did RCV education. Nussbaum named the Minnesota Voice 
Table, a coalition of community organizing groups who are focused on civic engagement, as well 
as the Minneapolis Foundation. 
Both convened groups of people that were focusing on engagement of under-represented 
populations and a big focus of both those tables’ work was education around the system 
and reaching out to people who like to get involved in the process, so that happened to an 
extent that I haven’t seen in general. 
The city’s post-election report (Minneapolis City Council Standing Committee on 
Elections, 2014) offered a complete description of its voter education activities. According to the 
report, the city’s Elections team partnered with multiple city departments on voter outreach and 
education, including Communications, Neighborhood & Community Relations, Minneapolis 
311, and Information Technology. Election information was made available via the city’s 
website, social media, and internet chat, and through videos, handouts, and a voter information 
guide which was mailed to every household. A sample ballot for the mayor’s race can be found 
in Appendix A. The city’s Voter Ambassador program trained community-based leaders, 
campaign staff, and a small number of community organization staff on RCV. Elections staff, in 
cooperation with voter ambassadors and FairVote Minnesota, reached voters face-to-face at 
National Night Out activities, at education sessions (with a particular focus on faith communities 
and senior citizens), at community events and festivals, through neighborhood organizations, and 
through National Voter Registration Day events. Further outreach targeted high school and 
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college students, candidate forums, and employed traditional advertising (Minneapolis City 
Council Standing Committee on Elections, 2014). 
The city’s post-election report also included mention of a post-election survey conducted 
on behalf of the city (Minneapolis City Council Standing Committee on Elections, 2014), but did 
not offer a complete assessment of the effectiveness of the voter education program. Schultz 
offered one criticism of the city’s education efforts. He said that while education efforts were 
better in 2013 than they were in 2009, the city “still [doesn’t] have good evidence in terms of 
how effective it was. You’d want to know more about who they reached, who they educated, 
what they did, and then actually find out what the results were compared to 2009.” The post-
election report indicated that the 2013 post-election survey largely mirrored the 2009 post-
election survey so the two could be accurately compared (Minneapolis City Council Standing 
Committee on Elections, 2014). As such, it is unlikely that Schultz’s criticism regarding 
assessing the effectiveness of voter education can be addressed with the data collected. 
Some campaigns did explicit voter education on the process of casting a ranked choice 
ballot. Said Strategist C: 
We had script trainings. …We did trainings for every one of our volunteer events. We 
explained exactly what we’re trying to talk to people about as far as [our candidate] and 
then exactly what we were trying to explain about the voting process. Everybody got 
trained to talk to voters about what’s gonna happen when they get to the polling room on 
election day… We were gauging whether or not to do any more voter education based on 
the response we heard at the door. For the most part, we felt like they understood exactly 
what was going on. 
Some campaigns chose not to do voter education on RCV. Strategist A said: 
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You had an entire organization called FairVote Minnesota that was doing voter 
education. And frankly, our opponents were doing voter education on how to do ranked 
choice voting. Smart, I suppose. But all they were doing was teaching their voters how to 
vote for us in second place… There was so much media coverage [and] work put into 
ranked choice voting and education on it, we didn’t have to do any of it. 
Voter education was also inherent in campaigns’ identification and persuasion process, 
simply by talking to voters about first, second, and third choices. 
Lastly, education on ranked choice voting took place within campaigns. The City of 
Minneapolis and FairVote Minnesota offered training for campaigns, as mentioned in the 
discussion of the city’s post-election report. Additionally, some campaign strategists and 
candidates did their own research into what strategies were employed in other races in this 
election, and in elections in other municipalities, including the 2010 Oakland, CA mayor’s race. 
Strategist B said: 
We would spend time trying to figure out what difference this would make and should we 
be doing something different. We would have those conversations educating ourselves, 
[asking] what does this mean? What impact will this have? So there was a lot of learning 
about ranked choice voting, but it was internal to the campaign. The mayor’s race was a 
great educator. 
Positivity and Lack of Negative Campaigning 
Campaigns, mostly, did not use negative campaigning. Schultz defined negative 
campaigning as attack ads or other overt personal attacks, as distinguished from criticism of rival 
candidates. All interviewees observed that overall, the tone amongst campaigns was unusually, 
remarkably positive. Nussbaum made this observation: 
Running head: RANKED CHOICE VOTING IN MINNEAPOLIS 2013 ELECTIONS  
 
45
I would say, broad strokes, it was the most positive election I’ve observed. As far as, we 
did not see any pieces of mail, all the traditional attack [ads], mail, TV, phone calls, like 
anything a campaign would do, we didn’t observe a single instance of negative 
campaigning, which I’ve never seen before. It included independent expenditures. So I 
think that led me to believe that there was an intentional choice by the campaigns not to 
do that. I think that if I were in their shoes it would be because I wouldn’t want to 
alienate other people’s supporters because I would want their second and third choices… 
It’s the opposite of what you’d traditionally see which would be trying to bash these other 
candidates. 
Campaign strategists also said they would have been more likely to engage in negative 
campaigning in a non-RCV election; Strategist A explained, “If you, in a regular election, find 
somebody who is supporting the opponent, you just go and bash the opponent, say good things 
about you, and try to get them to switch their vote.” 
At the same time, most interviewees noted that there was negativity to be found. For 
example, Strategist B stated that racial politics were prominent at the party endorsing 
convention; the ward in which this campaign took place is very ethnically diverse, as were the 
delegates in attendance at the convention. Despite that, Strategist B observed that efforts were 
made to stay positive. 
It got to be a very nasty campaign… but people tried really hard to be positive. It’s that 
liberal culture, anti-conflict culture. As much as there were contrasts that both campaigns 
were making, they didn’t want to beat up on the other candidate. Every contrast that was 
created, it was thought very thoughtfully about what the impact would be. 
Strategist A saw it both ways: 
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I think this is, of all the positive things people say about a ranked choice voting election, 
about how they’re better than the other ones, you know people say. “Well, it’s more 
positive.” True this time, kind of? But it didn’t have to be. This campaign could have 
gotten really nasty, and that’s just the way it would have been. I think we saw some 
nastiness. 
Nussbaum suggested that the threshold at which such negativity is noticed is relative and 
observed that the threshold in this election was much lower due to the overall positivity, and 
gave examples from the mayoral race. 
I think you’re definitely seeing instances in other municipalities where negative 
campaigning really backfired, and I think you saw definitely the one or two times that 
people did go negative in debates having it really blow back. Those were just so jarring 
because it wasn’t happening, so for instance where Mark Andrew said about Betsy 
Hodges, she has the disease of a small vision. I mean that was a big deal. In any other 
political context, it would have been nothing, but the fact that it was so jarring because it 
was really one of the only instances we had in the campaign we could point to of actual 
negativity happening, with the exception of Cam Winton who I think just made a habit of 
kicking the crap out of Mark Andrew. I think people reacted. 
Schultz speculated on potential explanations for the positive tone: 
It could be also an indication of within the City of Minneapolis… that we’re seeing a 
generational shift going on in politics, that maybe there’s a sense in which — maybe, I 
can’t prove it — with a generational shift there’s less support and more distaste for 
negative campaigning. There could be lots of factors out there. Some of it could be self-
fulfilling. Some could be due to ranked choice voting. Some of it could be due just to the 
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personalities of people who ran. We are looking at two elections now with ranked choice 
voting in Minneapolis… You could still argue from a social science perspective, two is 
not enough to tell us a lot. 
So while, overall, interviewees observed that an abnormally high level of positivity from 
campaigns was evident, it is not clear that this particular strategy choice will endure. There were 
some conspicuous but rare instances of negativity. However, it appears that the positive tone 
could have been a self-fulfilling prophecy, as part of a narrative put forth by the media (Roper, 
2013, October 13) and by FairVote Minnesota through its public and campaign education efforts. 
Campaign strategists, most of whom were learning about RCV strategy for the first time, were 
taught that campaigning with RCV means campaigns have to stay positive so as not to alienate 
voters who are willing to grant second and third choices. Most campaigns chose to stay positive, 
and the few high-profile instances of negative campaigning were judged harshly, according to 
interviewees. 
This section has described a number of RCV-specific campaign strategies and tactics, 
according to strategists’ and election experts’ observations of 2013 municipal elections in 
Minneapolis. Campaigns used the word “choice” in asking for support. Campaigns kept in 
contact with voters identified as supporters of other candidates and made strategic choices in 
doing so. Coalition campaigning was not a significant factor in any municipal races in 
Minneapolis in 2013, as has been observed in other municipalities. Voter education was 
significant and conducted by multiple entities, but its effectiveness was not fully assessed 
following the election. Historically under-represented populations were engaged to varying 
degrees, and several observers indicated that this is increasingly a necessity for winning 
elections. Campaigns largely maintained a positive tone and abstained from negative attacks, 
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though there were isolated instances of negativity; some interviewees did not think that such a 
high level of positive campaigning would necessarily continue to be observed under RCV. The 
next section discusses the implications of these findings for the inclusivity effects of RCV. 
Discussion 
As described in the context set forth previously, RCV is claimed to be a more inclusive 
electoral process because it maximizes the number of voters participating in the decisive 
election, and because it mitigates the spoiler effect. RCV is also claimed to inspire more 
inclusive campaigning because candidates need to appeal to voters for second and third choice 
votes. My research question seeks to determine if these two conditions were met. 
I consider social justice to be an ideal in democracy. The democratic process consists of 
two parts. The first part is public deliberation, which I have cast as the activities of campaigns 
and of citizens in interaction with campaigns and each other. The second part is public decision-
making, which I have cast as election day. Two of our ideals for that democratic process are 
inclusion and equality. Inclusion means that everyone affected is part of the democratic process, 
making the decision legitimate. Equality means that everyone affected has equal right and 
effective opportunity to participate in the democratic process. 
When I said that I was studying RCV and inclusivity, interviewees were quick to ask 
what my definition of inclusion was. I provided with them with the premise stated in the research 
question, which is the twofold concept of an inclusive electoral process, and inclusive 
campaigning. I also invited them to give me their campaigns’ own working definitions of 
inclusion. Strategist C articulated inclusion as the need to talk to more voters, without any more 
specifics or nuance than that. Strategist B talked about engagement of historically under-
represented populations as examples of inclusion. Strategist A mentioned both of those 
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definitions, also saying that the campaign goal was simply to talk to as many voters as possible, 
but that doing so necessarily includes engaging historically under-represented populations. 
Interviewees’ individual concepts of inclusion can provide insight as to how campaigns 
make strategy choices. Regardless of those conceptions, however, I propose using Young’s 
(2000) concept of inclusion in democracy — in which a just democratic process consisting of 
public deliberation and public decision-making is inclusive and equal — to assess campaigns’ 
practices in Minneapolis in 2013.  To determine whether RCV inspired more inclusive 
campaigning consistent with Young’s social justice ideals, I will consider how campaign 
behavior and strategy choices as described in the findings contributed to inclusive and equal 
public deliberation. Similarly, to determine if RCV functioned as an inclusive electoral system 
consistent with Young’s social justice ideals, I will consider whether RCV contributed to 
inclusive and equal public decision-making. 
The Role of RCV in Inclusive Public Deliberation 
Gastil and Black (2008), in examining public deliberation in political conversation, 
describe it as a dual process of information gathering, which is task-oriented and analytical, 
paired with a relational, social process. 
Analytic and social processes of public deliberation. Gastil and Black (2008) describe 
the analytic process as having five components: creating a solid information base, prioritizing 
key values, identifying potential solutions to address an issue, weighing those solutions, and 
finally making the best possible decision. 
These components of an analytic process can be matched with campaign trail activities 
that satisfy these analytic needs. Using Gastil and Black’s terminology in this context positions 
candidates for elected office as solutions to be weighed. Candidates meet individually and in 
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small groups with voters. Candidates participate in public forums on a variety of issues and in a 
variety of locations; such forums are usually organized or sponsored by community-based and 
issue-based groups. Campaigns use paid media such as direct mail, possibly television and radio, 
and other advertising means to convey information to the public. Campaigns also use owned 
media, primarily the Internet and social media, and earned media, like word of mouth and 
journalistic media coverage, to convey information about candidates to the public. 
Via these channels, campaigns and voters communicate with each other, in order to 
provide voters with the information they need to satisfy the analytic process of public 
deliberation. Voters continue to discuss this information with each other, possibly staying in 
conversation with campaigns while doing so. These discussions take place in person or in digital 
formats, such as by email or via social media. 
How does RCV make this discussion more inclusive, where everyone affected is 
participating, and more equal, where everyone affected has effective opportunity to participate? I 
posit that RCV works by influencing the social process in public deliberation. 
Gastil and Black (2008) describe the social process of public deliberation as having four 
components: adequate opportunity to speak, a right to comprehend what others are saying, an 
obligation to carefully consider what others are saying, and respect for fellow participants. 
Gastil and Black (2008), in applying this framework to elections, describe both individual 
voter behaviors and electoral system functions according to both the analytic and social 
processes. Individual voter behavior is clearly defined as seeking, receiving, and assessing 
available information on candidates, and ultimately casting a vote. 
It should be noted that Gastil and Black’s conception of the electoral system differs from 
the definition we are working with. Where the RCV literature more narrowly defines the 
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electoral system as the procedures by which votes cast are translated into elected officials, Gastil 
and Black (2008) consider the electoral system as a larger structure that also includes conveying 
communal values, supplying potential candidates accordingly, and facilitating the public 
deliberation. Nevertheless, some theoretical benefits of RCV, and some observed campaign 
behaviors in Minneapolis in 2013 under RCV, speak directly to components of Gastil and 
Black’s social process of public deliberation. 
Strategist B offered this observation of the deliberative nature of voters in the mayor’s 
race in Minneapolis in 2013, highlighting consideration and respect in the social process: 
One of the things that was interesting to me about the mayor’s election was three weeks 
out, everyone knew how many candidates were running for mayor and nobody would say 
who they were supporting, because they took it all very seriously, and they studied it very 
thoughtfully. People made their decisions – active always voters, not undecided voters or 
swing voters – at the end, weighing a lot of information and taking it very thoughtfully. 
And that was an impression that I was left for ranked choice voting and in part because 
that mayor’s campaign, in my opinion, never got nasty outside of the inner circles of 
Minneapolis politics. 
One expectation of RCV is that campaigns need to broaden their appeal to try to earn 
second and third choice votes. By refraining from negative attacks, they stayed in a place of 
consideration and respect. My findings described the largely positive tone observed in the 
mayor’s race and in some city council races in Minneapolis in 2013. Campaigns also stayed in 
contact with more voters under RCV, in Minneapolis in 2013, showing consideration and respect 
for voters as fellow participants in public deliberation. 
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When campaigns chose which community events to attend and which issues to publicly 
debate in a forum, they made choices about which communities to include. Similarly, 
communities and organizations organize such activities to bring the candidate to the community. 
Strategist A described, as reported in the Findings, how that campaign prioritized events geared 
towards women and the LGBT community over other events. Those choices help broaden the 
access of citizens to the information gathering process, and also convey an additional analytical 
message to a voter that a candidate is considering a community’s unique issues. 
It is important to note that the elements of the social process might manifest differently in 
different communities, according to those communities’ cultural norms. Structured elements of 
the political process are based on a normative expectation for how conversations between people 
“should” go – either between voters and campaigns, or among voters. However, different cultural 
groups have constructed different norms for how conversations are carried out. Such norms 
might dictate elements such as the language used, body language used, slang used, the order in 
which participants are allowed to speak and whether they might interrupt, or whether there are 
gender-based rules about who participates. 
The role of community organizing in public deliberation. Another tool that is useful in 
influencing the social process of public deliberation is community organizing. According to 
Staples (2012), there are principles that are inherent to the community organizing process: 
collective action, participatory processes, indigenous leadership, and decreasing power 
disparities, all for the purpose of achieving shared goals. 
One of the primary strategies for community organizing effort in a campaign context is 
conversation. Campaigns use phone banking and door knocking to persuade voters to support a 
candidate. A community organizing strategy changes the nature of what canvassers are saying to 
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voters, for example by employing the relational component of developing new understandings of 
the social world by inviting a voter to speak freely about an issue of concern. 
If a campaign is using an RCV-oriented strategy, when a voter says that they are 
supporting another candidate, instead of discontinuing the conversation, a canvasser instead 
seeks a commonality between the candidate the voter is supporting and the candidate the 
canvasser is working for. This allows a campaign to engage voters on issues first, and to refrain 
from negative attacks in doing so. According to Strategist A: 
Second and third place voters were treated like undecided voters and given the same 
persuasion messaging, versus a general election where it’s two or three people, you’re 
just trying to take those first place votes. So if you, in a regular election, find somebody 
who is supporting the opponent, you just go and bash the opponent, say good things 
about you, and try to get them to switch their vote. This one, it was “Oh well that’s great 
you’re supporting [another candidate]. We like [that candidate], too. Can I tell you 
something about [our candidate]?” 
Some campaigns had endorsing organizations such as labor unions doing voter contact, in 
which union members identified themselves as such and advocated for a candidate based on the 
candidate’s positions on the union’s issues. In this way, campaigns leveraged staff and 
volunteers with key connections to issues and related organizations or communities to legitimize 
the campaign in its engagement with voters on issues, and to lend authority to the assertion that a 
candidate will be responsive to voters on those issues. Strategist C spoke of engaging voters on 
issues first, with the help of labor unions: 
Firefighters were a great help to us in terms of actually going out to do some door 
knocking and talk to people about some of the important issues there. [Our candidate] 
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was on an ambulance in college and did emergency service work, so… they talked a great 
deal about the importance of safety in the community and things like that as well. There’s 
also a fair amount of firefighters who lived in the area that wanted to talk to their 
neighbors… It was a way to have a conversation with a group of people who cared 
deeply about a specific issue. For example [with] the firefighters it was safety of the 
community and also safety of the firefighters. 
Nussbaum gave another example of engaging voters on issues first: 
I think it was a general consensus that [certain candidates] were not in the running for 
actually winning, so [other campaigns] would send targeted mail to people that they 
identified as those people’s supporters saying “I know [the candidate you support] is a 
big education candidate.” They would send mail targeted to those supporters saying, “I 
support the same positions as [that candidate], I stand with [that candidate] on this issue, I 
would appreciate your second choice.” 
Community organizing around an election, from within a community instead of a 
campaign, also allows a community to carry out the public deliberation with its own social 
process. Strategist B spoke of the relational nature of deliberation, naming campaign supporters 
who were influential members of historically under-represented communities, carrying out one-
to-one conversations with others in their respective communities regarding the candidate and the 
candidate’s responsiveness to issues important to that community. 
I think it’s important in campaigns to recognize that this is both done through formal 
organizing and informal organizing. I think if not for the informal support, the campaign 
couldn’t have won itself by just the formal organizing. Especially in this district of 
activists who know everybody. 
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Strategist C also described efforts to organize from within a community, even from the 
campaign’s perspective: 
We tried to keep the volunteers local. For example we were doing door knocking in [one 
neighborhood in the Ward], we talked with the volunteers we had there, as opposed to 
people in [another neighborhood] or elsewhere. …We really wanted to make sure that it 
was a neighbor to neighbor, peer to peer, grassroots organization where we could talk 
about everything as a conversation about what’s happening in our community. You 
know, “I’m a member of that community, I live a couple blocks away from you, and I 
want to talk to you about this issue, and talk to you about [this candidate].” We really did 
make an effort to make sure we were putting people into places they were familiar with, 
because not only was it easier for them, people don’t want to get a phone call from a 
stranger and have no basis for [connecting]. 
Further, there are power disparities when formal political structures are dictating the 
social process. For example, my experience at the DFL Party endorsing convention for city 
offices in Minneapolis in 2013 was that the proceedings were conducted in English and followed 
a version of Robert’s Rules of Order for parliamentary procedure, as dictated by the DFL Party 
and its leadership. If I did not understand English well, or if I were unfamiliar with parliamentary 
procedure, I would have been at a disadvantage in understanding and hence influencing the 
proceedings. Community organizing is a way of bridging that gap, by facilitating the analytical 
process of choosing and ranking candidates while making room for alternative social processes 
for public deliberation. Strategist B described how community organizing in the Latino 
community benefited the campaign: 
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[Our candidate] would not have gotten the DFL endorsement if the Latino community 
hadn’t shown up. Interesting thing to acknowledge that her DFL convention may have 
been, I think, 15-20% Latino. So it’s not a situation where the Latino community showed 
up and then they just took over. But that endorsement was so close, if that community 
had not shown up, [we] would not have gotten the endorsement. And that was community 
organizing. There were leaders in [our] campaign in the Latino community who were 
organizing for [us], and that was a lot of leadership development, because there were lots 
of people who were at their first caucus. First caucus and first convention.… And then 
that continued throughout the election so that there was Latino community-based work 
happening through the campaign. There were lists, and there were callers, and there were 
volunteers. 
A community organizing campaign strategy that focuses on conversations between the 
campaign and voters necessarily requires people to carry out this relational activity. It cannot be 
carried out via paid media. So in using a community organizing strategy, the public deliberation 
process is more inclusive and more equal by engaging more people and by accommodating 
different social processes for deliberation. Strategist A spoke about staff and volunteers carrying 
out an organizing strategy: 
By the time the… general election came around, our staff and our volunteers were well 
acquainted with asking for second and third place votes, whereas some of our opponents 
openly bragged about not asking for second place votes. So when it came time for them 
to do so, they didn’t know how…Our average conversation length was nine minutes with 
a voter. In a regular general election that is horrible. In a regular general election you 
want minute-long conversations because it’s quantity, not quality. 
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With RCV, campaigns need to appeal to more voters than just first choice supporters, and 
they need to appeal to voters in a more relational way to attract second and third choice support 
without negatively attacking an opponent. That makes a community organizing strategy 
particularly effective under RCV. 
The best example we have of that from Minneapolis elections in 2013 is Betsy Hodges’ 
campaign for mayor. Her campaign used an explicitly organizing-oriented strategy. Her 
campaign hired organizers to staff a field program months ahead of when they would have been 
hired in a traditional race. Strategist A named the total number of first, second, and third choice 
votes as a metric of success. Ultimately, Hodges appeared as a first choice on 35% of ballots. 
Further, she appeared as a first, second, or third choice on 63% of total ballots cast. 
The interview findings suggest that RCV influenced the public deliberation process, from 
the campaigns’ perspectives, by broadening the number of voters in the contact universe, and by 
improving the quality of discussion amongst candidates and their supporters. In Strategist A’s 
opinion: 
Ranked choice voting makes it imperative, whether or not that is a value of yours to run 
that sort of campaign. I think ranked choice voting makes it imperative to run that kind of 
campaign, and I think that’s what we saw in the mayor’s race. The most well-funded 
campaign did not win. The campaign with the most endorsements did not win. The 
campaign with the longest track record in Minneapolis politics did not win. This 
campaign I think shows very clearly that the campaign that had the biggest field 
operation and talked to the most voters - talked to - won. I think this campaign shows that 
it’s absolutely imperative in ranked choice voting to have the biggest campaign, the most 
inclusive campaign. In terms of regular elections, you can, yeah, if you can afford a 
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bigger field operation, get a bigger field operation if you can. But the reality is you don’t 
need that to win a regular primary-plus-general election. 
The interview findings show that campaigns didn’t engage diverse communities for the 
sake of being inclusive, but with the goal of winning the election. However, in using a 
community organizing strategy to engage voters, relationally, on issues that matter to them, the 
benefits of greater inclusion are achieved regardless of the campaign’s intention. 
The Role of RCV in Inclusive Decision-Making 
Young (2000), in linking inclusion and political equality, notes that a decision is 
legitimate only if all who are affected by it are included in the decision-making process. Further, 
all those affected should effectively have equal access to the decision-making process (Young, 
2000). 
Voter turnout. I will consider whether RCV met Young’s standards for inclusive and 
equal public decision-making in Minneapolis elections in 2013. RCV is claimed to be more 
inclusive as an electoral system because it “brings the election to where the voters already are” 
(Jerdonek, 2006, p. 53). RCV addresses this in a structural manner by consolidating two rounds 
of voting into one. Under RCV, decisive voting happens in one election, where the most people 
are participating (Jerdonek, 2006). It is not expected that RCV will directly boost or depress 
turnout relative to the general election in a non-RCV system. General election day, historically, 
has better turnout relative to primaries or runoffs. A review of voter turnout in Minneapolis 
shows that there is a clear, long-term difference in turnout for primary elections as compared to 
general elections. Figure 1 shows municipal election year voter turnout in Minneapolis from 
2001 to 2013. In 2001 and 2005, before the adoption of RCV, there is a clear gap in turnout 
between the primary and general elections. 
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Figure 2 shows federal election year voter turnout in Minneapolis from 2006 to 2012. 
RCV was not used for these elections, but the data further illustrates a trend in the turnout gap 
between primary and general elections in Minneapolis.
Figure 2. Minneapolis 
There is also evidence, using data from Minneapolis elections in 2005, that there is a 
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Minneapolis that have higher proportions of communities of color, as compared to areas of 
Minneapolis that have very few communities of color. In 2005, in Wards 4 and 5, which cover 
North Minneapolis, voter turnout at the general election was three times that of the primary 
election (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter Services, n.d.). Citywide, in 2005, voter turnout 
at the general election was twice that of the primary (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter 
Services, n.d.). Ward 13, covering much of southwest Minneapolis, has a very low proportion of 
communities of color; in 2005, primary election turnout in Ward 13 was 22%, nearly three times 
the primary election turnout of 8% in Wards 4 and 5 (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter 
Services, n.d.). Wards 4 and 5 were the only wards in 2005 that saw single digit voter turnout in 
the primary election (City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter Services, n.d.). By eliminating the 
primary election where voter turnout is lower and demographically skewed away from 
historically marginalized populations, RCV contributes to more inclusive and equal decision-
making by ensuring a larger, more diverse population is participating in the election with all the 
candidates on the ballot. 
Interview subjects agreed that electoral conditions in any given election year are more 
likely to influence general election day turnout than the electoral system itself. According to 
Schultz, turnout for Minneapolis municipal elections in 2013 was likely up compared to 2009 
due to a competitive mayor’s race. 
It could be the fact of 35 candidates on the ballot, perceived that this is an election that’s 
close, at least among 3 or 4 candidates. Everybody mobilized their constituencies really 
hard. Voters were contacted. Voters felt that their vote might make a difference. All that 
is consistent with any models in political science for why voter turnout would tick up. 
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It is, however, still possible that in the longer term RCV can have indirect effects on 
turnout. To the extent that RCV leverages and magnifies the effectiveness of community 
organizing for the purposes of achieving electoral outcomes, and that community organizing 
continues to be a prominent tool in campaigns in RCV elections, the civic engagement created by 
community organizing activity could potentially translate to higher voter turnout. 
Additionally, having more desirable candidate options on the decisive election day, as is 
the case with RCV, can also have a positive influence on voter turnout. Kenig asserts that 
restricting potential candidates from participating reduces competitiveness (2008). If it follows, 
in the reverse, that enabling more potential candidates to participate increases competitiveness, 
then removing the primary election and allowing all candidates to participate in the general 
election, as RCV does, could potentially increase voter turnout. Strategist B also acknowledged 
that only having one primary competitor reduced the likelihood of using ranking-oriented 
strategies. “If there was not a DFL endorsement, there would have been a lot more candidates on 
the ballot, and more need to be running ranking-oriented messages.” If a campaign sees no need 
to using ranking-oriented strategies because there are no competitors whose supporters are a 
source of second and third choice votes, that may reduce the breadth of outreach to voters that a 
campaign will attempt. Similarly, Nussbaum observed that diluting a base of support, as is the 
case when there are many competitive candidates with similar ideologies such as in the mayor’s 
race in Minneapolis in 2013, requires campaigns to reach out more broadly to earn support. In 
these ways, by keeping the most possible candidates on the election ballot, RCV may increase 
competitiveness, which could, in turn, increase voter turnout and inspire more inclusive 
campaigning. 
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Voters ranked their choices. FairVote Minnesota conducted a post-election survey, 
incorporating exit polling and public election return data (FairVote Minnesota Foundation, 
2013). This analysis determined that high percentages of voters across the city and across 
different races ranked their votes. This analysis also determined that high percentages of voters 
across demographics — age, ethnicity, income, and education — found RCV simple to use and 
were familiar with it before going to the polls, and majorities of voters across demographics want 
to continue using it and to use it for state elections. Tables 1-3 summarize the key findings 




Minneapolis 2013 Voters Who Ranked Candidates for a Given Office 
 
Jurisdiction – Office Ranked 2 Candidates Ranked 3 Candidates 
Ward 5 – City Council 75% 63% 
Ward 5 – Mayor 84% 76% 
Ward 13 – City Council 83% 63% 
Citywide – Mayor 88% 78% 





Minneapolis 2013 Voters Who Found RCV Very or Somewhat Simple to Use 
 
Demographic Attribute Found RCV Simple 
Total 85% 
Aged 18-34 91% 
Aged 65+ 81% 
With a College Education 88% 
Without a College Education 81% 
Income Above $100,000 87% 
Income Below $100,000 83% 
People of Color 82% 
Note. From “Ranked choice voting by the numbers: 2013 key Minneapolis election findings” by FairVote Minnesota 
Foundation, 2013. 
 





Minneapolis 2013 Voters Who Support Continued Use of RCV 
 
Demographic Attribute Support RCV 
Total – For Municipal Elections 68% 
Total – For State Elections 61% 
Aged 65+ 62% 
People of Color 59% 
Without a College Degree 63% 
Income Below $50,000 68% 
Note. From “Ranked choice voting by the numbers: 2013 key Minneapolis election findings” by FairVote Minnesota 
Foundation, 2013. 
 
A post-election survey conducted on behalf of the City of Minneapolis, according to the 
Minneapolis City Council Standing Committee on Elections report on the 2013 election, showed 
that “older residents who voted indicated a lower level of understanding of how Ranked Choice 
Voting functions than other age groups, and among non-voters, were more likely to indicate a 
belief that the Ranked Choice Voting system is difficult” (2014, p. 23-24). The FairVote 
Minnesota Foundation (2013) report found that 81% of voters aged 65 and older found RCV 
simple (compared to 91% of voters aged 18-34). This report also found that 62% of voters aged 
65 and older would like to continue to use RCV in municipal elections. The Minneapolis City 
Council committee report is publicly available, but does not include the full results of the survey. 
So while the city’s report notes differences observed with this older demographic, the report does 
not include survey numbers, making it impossible to discern a direct comparison between these 
two surveys. 
The FairVote Minnesota Foundation report also indicates that 88% of voters ranked a 
second choice and 78% of voters ranked three choices (the maximum allowable) in the mayoral 
race (2013). This analysis also cited low error rates; 0.5% of all ballots cast in the mayor’s race 
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had errors, and voter intent was able to determined (and hence the vote counted) for 90% of 
those ballots. 
FairVote Minnesota Foundation (2013) identified Ward 5, which is the southern half of 
North Minneapolis, as the city’s most ethnically diverse ward. FairVote Minnesota’s survey 
found that 84% of voters ranked a second choice and 76% ranked three choices in the mayor’s 
race. In that same ward, 75% ranked a second choice and 63% ranked three choices in the city 
council race. The analysis reports that less than 1% of ballots in this ward had errors on mayoral 
votes and zero ballots had errors on city council votes. 
Neely and Cook found that information cost historically contributes to the elderly, the 
less educated, lower-income voters, and voters with language barriers casting ballots that go 
uncounted (2008). However, Neely & Cook (2008) found that electoral conditions, such as 
having sufficient candidates to choose from and adequate voter education and outreach, might 
have mitigated such discrepancies. Analysis of Minneapolis 2009 municipal elections, the first 
use of RCV, indicates that voter confusion could be an issue but that firm conclusions could not 
be drawn (Schultz & Rendahl, 2010). The 2013 post-election polling included in FairVote 
Minnesota Foundation’s analysis of the 2013 election indicated that 85% of voters found RCV 
very or somewhat simple to use (2013). Eight-two percent of voters of color found RCV to be 
simple. Eighty-eight percent of voters with a college education found RCV to be simple, versus 
81% of voters without a college education. 
FairVote Minnesota’s determination was that there were no significant discrepancies 
across demographic groups in understanding and casting of ranked choice ballots in Minneapolis 
in 2013 (FairVote Minnesota Foundation, 2013). There were significant public education efforts 
around RCV from multiple sources in Minneapolis in 2013. The mayor’s race had 35 candidates 
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and so the top race on the ballot offered many candidates to choose from. It’s not possible to 
directly connect these conditions to error rates with the information available, but the mitigating 
conditions that Neely and Cook (2008) described did exist in this election and could have had the 
expected effect of reducing barriers to voting. 
This discussion has shown how RCV makes public deliberation more inclusive and equal 
by influencing the social process of deliberation that accompanies the analytic process of 
deciding. Community organizing strategies are particularly effective for influencing the social 
process. This discussion has also shown how RCV makes public decision-making more 
inclusive. Diminished voter turnout discrepancies between primary and general elections, high 
rates of ranked choices, low rates of ballot errors, parity across demographics, and high 
satisfaction ratings indicate that RCV was effective in translating votes into a collective decision 
on who should hold elected office in Minneapolis in 2013. 
Summary 
My research sought to determine if the use of the ranked choice voting electoral system 
in the Minneapolis 2013 municipal elections achieved its purported benefits by functioning as an 
inclusive electoral system and by inspiring more inclusive campaigns. Review of the literature 
established how RCV works and what its espoused benefits are, as well as a framework for 
assessing inclusion in democracy, background on electoral conditions and competitiveness, and a 
conception of community organizing as a relational activity for public deliberation. Interviews 
with campaign strategists and expert election observers collected data regarding campaign 
strategy, decision-making, results, and broader observations about RCV and this election. 
Multiple strategies were employed to ensure validity of the data. Analysis of the data and 
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comparison of election results to RCV’s espoused benefits shed light on the effectiveness and 
social justice implications of RCV. 
I determined that municipal elections in Minneapolis in 2013, in practice, did exhibit 
some evidence of greater inclusivity under RCV. In some instances, RCV did inspire more 
inclusive campaigning. Campaigns using RCV-oriented strategies maintained broader voter 
contact so as to earn second and third choices, maintained a positive tone, largely refrained from 
negative attacks, and used the language of “choice” in soliciting support for candidates. Some 
campaigns used elements of community organizing as RCV-specific strategies, including using 
relational conversations for voter contact. A community organizing strategy is more inclusive 
and equal – and hence more desirable – because it allows for different communities to carry out 
public deliberation using culturally-appropriate social processes alongside the analytic process of 
ranking candidates. 
Further, by removing primary elections, RCV functioned as a more inclusive electoral 
system by eliminating turnout discrepancies historically observed between primary and general 
elections. RCV also potentially functions as a more inclusive electoral system because it fosters 
competitiveness by keeping all candidates on the ballot for the decisive election, which in turn 
can boost voter turnout and inspire more inclusive campaigns. Finally, data suggests that voters 
across demographics ranked their choices and also found RCV simple to use, indicating that 
barriers to participation due to complexity may have been mitigated. 
By functioning as a more inclusive electoral system and by inspiring more inclusive 
campaigning, RCV in Minneapolis in 2013 did facilitate progress towards a more socially just 
democratic process. However, campaigns that behaved more inclusively by taking a more 
positive tone and staying in communication with more voters did not necessarily specifically 
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engage historically under-represented populations. In my estimation, failure to engage these 
communities does not fully satisfy commitment to social justice in our democratic processes, 
though it is understandable how resource constraints and district demographics can make such 
outreach difficult for individual campaigns to achieve. Campaigns that used community 
organizing strategies to engage diverse communities more fully satisfied this commitment to 
fairness. 
Areas for Further Study 
There were observed differences in campaign strategy in Minneapolis in 2013 based on 
the office candidates were seeking (mayor’s office versus city council) and the size of the 
population represented (city-wide versus individual wards). There was an order of magnitude of 
difference between typical spending on a mayoral campaign and a city council campaign. There 
may be yet another order of magnitude difference in spending between city council races, and 
Park and Recreation Board or Board of Estimate and Taxation races. Different levels of spending 
and the number of voters in a jurisdiction have an impact on campaign strategy choices, and this 
interacts with how RCV-specific choices are made. 
Once a candidate is elected to office, they have to govern. Schultz said: 
If we’re taking a broader notion, of which no one has argued yet so far, does ranked 
choice voting fundamentally change politics of a community? Well, depends on how you 
define fundamental changes. Does it change policy outputs? Hard to tell. Pretty much 
most of the places that have adopted ranked choice voting are liberal enclaves in the 
United States.” There is a great deal to be learned about how campaigning and winning in 
an RCV election translates to policy choices, the effects of those choices on constituents, 
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and ultimately on candidates’ chances for re-election. A longitudinal study to this effect 
would be instructive. 
As previously stated, the role of community organizing in elections is not a new 
phenomenon. It was leveraged in different ways in different campaigns in this election. An 
interesting area of inquiry would be the impact of the RCV electoral system on the effectiveness 
of community organizing as a tool to develop individual and community power to achieve social 
change in the form of policy change carried out by elected representatives. 
As noted, Gastil and Black employ a more expansive concept of the electoral system than 
most of the RCV literature, considering campaign behavior and some aspects of public 
deliberation (2008, p. 10-13). An interesting analysis would be to examine more closely how a 
conception of RCV per Gastil and Black’s broader electoral system definition holds up under 
Young’s inclusion principles. 
Schultz also said, “[T]he City of Minneapolis is… becoming a significantly multi-racial 
city and if you decide you’re just gonna appeal to the old DFL urban white liberal coalition, 
you’re not gonna win. ” An examination of voting patterns of historically under-represented 
populations over a period of several elections, along with correlations between that turnout and 
electoral conditions could identify if turnout patterns track differently with RCV than they did 
before Minneapolis adopted RCV. Such an examination might reveal if the use of RCV changes 
the degree to which electoral conditions affect turnout. 
The Future of RCV 
As Schultz noted in our interview, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the long-
term success, effects, or implications of adopting RCV after just two elections. Based on my 
findings and analysis, I have concluded that there is value in the continued use of RCV as an 
Running head: RANKED CHOICE VOTING IN MINNEAPOLIS 2013 ELECTIONS  
 
69
electoral system that encourages campaigns to talk to more voters, and to do so in a way 
designed to attract, rather than repel voters. 
I find value in the deliberative process, and in accommodating the needs and rights of 
citizens to carry out that process in a manner that is appropriate to each individual’s cultural 
background (for example, one in which English is not the first language), not necessarily uniform 
across communities, and not necessarily dictated from the viewpoint of any group that has 
historically had the power to define the process (such as the political party leadership at a party’s 
endorsing convention). The potential for RCV to afford leverage to community organizing 
approaches to campaigning is exciting to me. It is hard to trust the wisdom of the crowd when 
the crowd decides differently from you as an individual, but it is a bit easier to respect the 
wisdom of the crowd when there is inclusive and equal deliberation, and when there is integrity 
in the decision-making process. 
It is interesting to think about Gastil and Black’s supposition that an electoral system 
ought to also have a responsibility to supply qualified candidates, juxtaposed with the 
expectation that community organizing ought to build leadership in its participants. These things 
working in concert, ideally, ensure a successfully functioning representative democracy in which 
public deliberation selects elected officials who further deliberate on decisions which in turn 
affect the electorate. Community organizing has long built community leaders. It is exciting to 
think of a future in which RCV creates the leverage to propel such leaders—who came into their 
power through an inclusive, equal, and just democratic process—into elected positions, where 
they can then govern from that inclusive, equal, and just perspective. By building social power 
with and for others, community leaders born of the organizing process will earn my trust that 
they can truly represent my interests, my values, and my experiences. 
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My own aspirations to indigenous leadership from within the communities I inhabit, or 
possibly even elected representation, rest firmly on my belief that a more inclusive electoral 
system like RCV brings further value to the democratic process. Minneapolis has shown that 
RCV can be successfully implemented, and that it can spur a public conversation about how we 
self-determine our governance. RCV may still be considered novel even in Minneapolis and the 
other U.S. cities where it has been adopted. But the fact that the RCV electoral system itself is 
even a topic of conversation is a victory, because we are publicly deliberating on our democratic 
process, with a hopeful and optimistic (if cautious) outlook. 
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Research Question: Did the use of a ranked choice voting electoral system in Minneapolis 2013 
municipal elections achieve its purported benefits by functioning as an inclusive electoral 




Purpose: Establish RCV theory-in-use. 
Objectives: Determine campaign strategy choices. Determine if/how those choices differ from 
previous system. Determine if inclusion was explicitly addressed in strategy. Determine if 
strategies were considered effective. 
 
1) Can you briefly describe your experience in politics prior to working on last fall’s 
campaign? 
2) What was your role in the campaign you contributed to? 
3) Thinking about that campaign, describe some strategies your campaign implemented or 
considered that were specifically aimed at earning second and third choice votes. Prompt: 
Did you consider this strategy successful? How did you assess that? Prompt: Are there 
any others?  
4) How were your strategy choices in this election different from elections where a primary 
election takes place? 
5) Did your campaign specifically target any historically under-represented voting 
populations? If so, what was the campaign’s reason for doing so? How were those 
populations chosen and what did that targeting look like? If not, describe how that 
decision was made. 
6) Describe your campaign’s voter turnout (GOTV) strategy. 
7) Describe how your campaign distinguished the candidate from ideologically similar 
competitors. 
8) Describe your campaign’s voter education efforts around ranked choice voting. 
9) Tell me about a time when the candidate’s or campaign’s ethics or values were discussed 
in the context of a strategy choice. 
10)  In your opinion, how did ranked choice voting foster inclusivity in this election from a 
voter’s perspective? From a campaign’s perspective? 




Expert Election Observers 
 
Purpose: Establish RCV espoused theory. Gather expert assessment of RCV theory-in-practice. 
Objectives: Describe purported benefits of RCV system, specifically regarding inclusion. Expert 
analysis of outcomes in RCV elections in Minneapolis. Expert analysis of outcomes in RCV 
elections in other localities. 




1) What is your current title and role? 
2) Can you briefly describe your experience as it relates to the study of elections? 
3) What strategy choices did you observe/have you observed that were specifically aimed at 
earning second and third choice votes. Prompt: Did you consider the strategy successful? 
How did you assess that? Prompt: Are there any others? 
4) What strategy choices did you observe/have you observed in ranked choice voting 
elections that differed from elections where a primary election takes place? 
5) How did you observe candidates and campaigns distinguishing themselves from 
ideologically similar competitors? 
6) How would you characterize public education efforts from the city or from campaigns as 
a means of mitigating the complexity of casting a ranked choice ballot? Prompt: Specific 
examples from the city? Specific examples from a campaign? 
7) In your opinion, how did/does ranked choice voting foster inclusivity in this election 
from a voter’s perspective? 
8) In your opinion, how did/does ranked choice voting foster inclusivity in this election 
from a campaign’s perspective? 
9) What did you observe in this election as far as enfranchisement or disenfranchisement of 
historically under-represented populations? 
10) Do you have any other observations of how this election differed from a non-RCV 
election? 
 
